The always excellent Mrs. du Toit sets out to re-educate her readers on what really happened in Vietnam, rather than the socialist spin that professional pedagogues put on it for the “benefit” of our youth. Her reason for doing so is to explode the Iraq-is-like-the-Vietnam-quagmire myth.

She is correct in the premise (The Viet Nam ? Iraq analogy is bogus and invented) even if she has a couple of details wrong. Let me explain.

1. LBJ did not inherit the war; he was the main instigator from the American side. She is correct in that Ike sent advisors and this policy was continued and even expanded the advisory force. But that was the extent of his involvement. He did not deploy major ground and air forces into Viet Nam; that was done by LBJ. An advisory force is small and could be withdrawn easily. Not so the Field Force deployed by LBJ.

   
   Prior to the 1964 election, several North Vietnamese patrol boats sortied out against a couple of US destroyers deployed in the Gulf of Tokin. The situation was confusing, but it was widely believed at the time that the patrols boats were attaching the Americans, an unprovoked attack. LBJ went to Congress and obtained the ?Gulf of Tokin Resolution? which authorized major force deployment to the Republic of Viet Nam to stabilize that state and prevent a communist takeover from the North.

   
   Make no mistake about it; this was LBJ?s war and it can?t be blamed on Eisenhower or Kennedy. (Disagree)

2. McNamara ? A man who knew the cost of everything and the value of nothing. (Agree)

3. The war was micromanaged by the White House and State. Please note that the last political leader to micromanage a war was Hitler after 1943. You can see how well that turned out. (Agree)

4. Support for the war by the American voting public waned, then turned sharply against it. Without public support, our liberal democracy cannot successfully prosecute a war. This is the way our Founding Fathers designed the constitution and that is the way it should be. (Agree)

5. Public opinion was affected by several factors. It is important to remember that we had a draft. The draft was perceived as unfair. Rich kids and the educated elites could avoid service, while poor rednecks and blacks had to go. This was not unreasonable, although evaluation of zip codes for the men on the wall does not confirm that the ?overwhelming poor? were the victims of the draft.

6. The turning point came at the Tet Offensive of January-February 1968. Things were relatively quiet in Viet Nam and General Westmorland, McNamara, and LBJ were all reassurances.

   
   The Viet Cong with their North Vietnamese masters determined that the time was ripe for an overwhelming attack by irregular forces in the South supported by a major incursion by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) from the North. So the Southern irregular forces rose up and was slaughtered. It was real easy to identify the enemy; he was the guy shooting at you.

   
   The result was a complete and utter tactical defeat for the communist and a complete and utter strategic defeat for the U.S. (?Huh??) The Administration through the President, Secretary of Defense and General Westmorland were saying that we were winning and the ability of the communists forces to sustain offensive operations were negligible. Then came Tet and the people could see the inconsistency which many called a ?lie?.

7. One of the things she doesn?t discuss was the inconsistency in the performance by the U.S. military. We had some very good commanders in charge of some very good units, but we also had unimaginative commander in charge of slothful units. And we did not seem to have a good method to communicate ?lessons learned?. Command at the senior level improved when General Abrams replaced General Westmorland. (Can you tell that I am not a fan of Westmorland? Wesly reminds me of him.)

8. Back to the point ? Iraq is not Viet Nam. There is no North Viet Nam supported by China and the Soviet Union to provide weapons and supplies to the insurgents.

9. The numbers and percentage of insurgents to population are very much lower in Iraq than was the case in Viet Nam. Additionally, many of the insurgents are from outside the country. With the Iraqi population support, foreigners can be identified rather easily. We must gain that support to win decisively. Otherwise, we will ?slog? along and may lose in the end, although I rather doubt that will occur.

See also the Opinion Journal?s Best of the Web today, especially Cohen?s column. (I refuse to register with the ?Red Rag? and don?t know what it says.)

Great Minds Think Alike
“Vietnam It Isn’t”–headline, Richard Cohen column, Washington Post, Oct. 30
“It’s No Vietnam”–headline, Thomas Friedman column, New York Times, Oct. 30
“Another Vietnam? No”–headline, Ralph Peters column, New York Post, Oct. 30

Guest Post authored by Advised by Wolves